The state of Turkey as we know it today emerged from the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, a region that encompassed the land we call the Middle East. However, having been the ruling center of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey’s role after World War I was much more influential over the other emerging nation states’ autonomy than those states had for themselves. While the French and the English were drawing up arbitrary lines to divvy up the land destined to be within their own respective colonial projects, Turkey itself was scrambling to retain some semblance to its former Ottoman glory. In other words, they were attempting to keep as much former Ottoman territory as possible before the West intervened with land treaties for peoples such as the Kurds and the Armenians.
Map of the Middle East at the tail end of the Ottoman Empire in 1914 and after French and British mandates effective 1922. Map from FreeReublic.com
Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points and the treaties of Sevres and Lausanne all had clauses which spoke to the self-determination of those who were able to organize themselves as separate entities from Turkey. It was due to the lack of actual intent behind these claims of support by the West and, rather more realistically, the lack of enthusiasm Turkey had for losing more of its former territory, that the Kurds were not granted their own autonomous land and that the Armenians were slaughtered for such aspirations. (Robert Fisk’s The Great War for Civilization, is a great source for this subject.) Since WWI, the West’s relationship with Turkey since WWI has been connected to one very distinct phrase that is hardly ever substituted or minced, and that is “territorial integrity.” This is a right granted to all sovereign states under international law. However, its validity of use in some contexts are questionable at best.
OES at a Glance
The Syrian conflict has brought back an intense case on Turkey’s part to defend their territorial integrity as their Syrian Kurdish neighbors south of border are obtaining territory in their US-backed conflict with Daesh/ISIS. Operation Euphrates Shield, the joint operation between a string of FSA (Free Syrian Army) groups and the Turkish military is an objective to decrease the military and political power of not only common adversaries with the West, but also our allies, the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
The operation began on August 24, 2016 with the liberation of the Syrian border city of Jarablus from Daesh control. In November, Al-Monitor estimated that the total number of fighters in the operation from all three main coalition members (Turkish Forces, FSA, and Hawar Kilis Operations Room) amounts to over 2,500 fighters and that over 1,270 square kilometers have been liberated from Daesh and the YPG. However, since the publishing of this article, OES has continued to move south, pushing Daesh out of villages such as Ziyadiya and Akhtarin, and is currently working on liberating Al-Bab and its surrounding villages.
The villages mentioned here represent a mere fraction of the tens of villages liberated from Daesh by Turkish and FSA forces. Below, the growing dark-green territory represents OES advances from August 24, 2016 to January 13, 2017. (Light green: FSA, Black: Daesh/ISIS, Yellow: SDF/YPG, Red: SAA)
But Turkey’s fight against Daesh hasn’t come from necessity or from any need to preserve their territorial integrity, perse. Much of Ankara’s efforts against Daesh domestically and beyond their borders has been in direct correspondence with suggestions by the West to crack down on coalition objectives (rather than indulging in Daesh’s oil trade or quarrelling with Western allies). Erdogan has come out expressly to reiterate that the end goal of OES is to force the Kurds back over the Euphrates, a goal made obvious by their name.
When observing a large protrusion of YPG territory surrounding Manbij (which can be seen in the last few frames of the animated map), it seems that OES is carving out strategic positions around Manbij as they liberate villages from Daesh. This territorial protrusion, otherwise known as a salient or a pocket, consists of a few villages surrounding the now Daesh-held town of Al-Arimah. Since November, Daesh, OES, and the YPG have been losing and gaining a handful of villages to each other as Daesh and OES attempt to cut this pocket off from the larger YPG held territory. This would of course expedite any advances on Manbij.
OES not only prioritizes attacks on both fronts, but also their use of tanks and armored vehicles. In an article written by Jeff Jagar for the Small War Journal in October 2016, the assortment of tanks available to OES forces is laid out and contrasted with those actually being used and their quality:
…Turkey has lost at least nine tanks to enemy ATGMs [anti-tank guided missile], either to Russian-made AT-17 Kornets used by [Daesh] or to U.S.-made TOWs used by Kurdish rebels. ATGMs remain an effective weapon against tanks, especially if the targeted tanks are older models with insufficient applique armor and/or if they lack organic add-on explosive or reactive armor. In OES, Turkey is mostly using M20A3s, which unfortunately exemplify both of these weaknesses. While Turkey fields a range of tanks, including various versions of the M48, M60, Leopard 1, and Leopard 2, the M60A3–which is protected by generations-old armor–has been Turkey’s tank of choice so far in OES.
Although Jager states that M60A3s are currently in conflict with Kurdish fighters, these flimsy tanks are being used in lieu of heavier ones. Despite the disposable nature of divisions led by M60A3s and escorted by ACV-15 armored vehicles and Leopards, OES has been making sweeping advances on Daesh. Based on Ankara’s rhetoric and patterns exhibited in their offensive strategies, these first stages of OES mainly focus on liberating territory from Daesh to carve out enclaves from which OES can plan advances on YPG-held territory. Here it makes sense for OES to carry out highly strategized operations with second-rate armaments against a lesser priority to preserve strength and firepower for the main priority. OES’s acquisition of villages already liberated by the SDF proves to further the idea that Daesh remains a lesser priority and threat to Ankara’s objectives despite their status as a NATO ally and, by extension, a coalition member.
OES ACV-15 armed combat vehicle overturned by a Daesh explosive, most like a mine/IED.
This relatively new front in the Syrian conflict came into effect just a month after a failed coup attempt against Erdogan’s AKP government. The coup caused severe backlash in which government and military officials, educators, and journalists were purged from their positions of power and influence. For those who identified as Kurdish, it was made known that they would, more than ever, be under suspicion of supporting more liberal Gülen-supported actions in favor of their own advancement. Territorial integrity once again became a prime concern for Erdogan.
Fethullah Gulen, the self-exiled preacher and leader of the liberal anti-authoritarian/anti-AKP movement named after him. Erdogan blames this movement largely for the failed coup of July 2016.
Erdogan’s enemies such as the Kurdish terrorist group, the PKK, the SDF/YPG, and supporters of the Gülen anti-authoritarian (or rather simply anti-Erdogan) movement became a more tangible threat to him and an even greater reason to put this fear of being overpowered to action in the form of an operation south of the border. Erdogan’s battle for territorial integrity and international respect has turned preemptive, both in domestic efforts towards the PKK in areas of southern Turkey and in the form of OES (Operation Euphrates Shield) in Syria against Daesh and the SDF/YPG, those he claims are connected and give legitimacy to the PKK’s actions against the state of Turkey.
Erdogan fears that Kurdish advancement towards autonomy in Syria will embolden future actions by the PKK. However, the Syrian Democratic Forces recently announced via social media that they no longer wish to be associated with the PKK. In recent years, the extremist actions by the PKK have not meshed well with the democratic confederalist ideology exemplified by the PYD and mirrored by their sister group in Turkey, the HPG.
Much of the actualized aggression towards the US-backed YPG stems from the ignored threat made by Erdogan and his administration, stating that there would be consequences for moving west of the Euphrates river. Since the summer of 2016 up to the present, the YPG has defied this threat, remaining in the liberated city of Manbij and its surrounding villages, which, only a few months prior was occupied by Daesh.
Special thanks to Liveuamaps for their constant updates and interactive maps.
