Turkey’s presence in American foreign policy and public discourse has slid into the obscure in recent years. A NATO ally since 1952, Turkey has been praised by much of the Western world as a secular, democratic nation, and a success story of the Middle East. The public’s focus in the Middle East has been fixed tightly onto the states in which Islamist despots and terrorist groups are of concern to the US, namely Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Afghanistan. With a global reach, the Western/democratic world has much to absorb as its citizens are complicit in the actions made by the states in which they reside. As Turkish and US/European values diverge, it is important that more attention be given to this wavering democracy.
On April 16th Turkish citizens will vote on a constitutional referendum that could have drastic effects upon the state of democracy in Turkey, as well as its relationship with Europe and the US. Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a member of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), the spearhead of this referendum. In the event of its adoption, the ‘18 proposed amendments affecting 72 articles of the constitution President Erdogan would receive extended executive powers which, as a result of the AKP’s current majority in Turkish parliament, would render the other three main political parties almost voiceless.
Yes/No ballots
An OSCE report claims there are “58,291,898 registered voters, including 2,972,676 for the out of country voting.” The report goes on to say
The office of the prime minister will be abolished and some of the parliament’s oversight functions will be transferred to an executive presidency. The amendments will increase the number of seats in parliament [from 550] to 600 and empower the president to fill some key positions in the judiciary by direct appointment.
In addition, the age of those eligible for seats in parliament will drop from 25 down to 18. The report continues…
Amendments to the Constitution require either a two-thirds vote in parliament or a three-fifths vote in parliament combined with the president submitting the amendments to a referendum. A referendum that results in a simple majority of votes in favor of the amendments, effects the constitutional change. The proposed 18 amendments affecting 72 articles of the constitution will be voted on as a single package. There will be no question on a the ballot, voters will simply be asked to select yes or no to the package.
To decide yes or no on a package containing many nuances has made many nervous for the decision. Turkish news outlet Hurriyet Daily News quotes Erdogan, the primary beneficiary of the proposed referendum, as saying at a rally in Istanbul:
I appreciate those who say ‘no’ (to constitutional amendments) but I cannot put ‘yes’ and ‘no’ in the same equation. How can they be on the same scale? We appreciate them and that is another issue. Why? Because this is a democracy.
In many cases, governments that feel a need to assert that they are in fact a democracy, are usually turning into the opposite. An unchecked Erdogan raises concerns for many in the wake of international upset over rights abuses. July’s failed country-wide military coup attempt resulted in the deaths of civilians and military personnel, as well as the arrests of tens of thousands of civil servants, educators, and journalists, ‘including over 2,400 military personnel and 2,745 judges.’ Numbers of those detained peaked around 70,000, but on April 15, CNN reported the numbers have dropped to 47,155. Such a crackdown by the AKP has served to increase support for Erdogan, while simultaneously creating a more a more polarized political environment.
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A supporter holds a flag depicting Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan during a pro-government demonstration in Ankara, Turkey, July 20, 2016. REUTERS/Baz Ratner/File Photo
The possibility of an overreaching executive presidency in Turkey such as this comes after 14 years of AKP dominance. Many in Turkey and those who study it question why Erdogan would seek to strengthen the executive powers of a presidency preceded by and existing in a constant majority of his party in parliament? What is being sustained by the AKP’s hold on power that could not be put into the hands of another party?
For Americans and anti-Daesh/ISIS Coalition countries, Turkey’s aversion and downright hostility towards US Kurdish allies in Syria proves to be a worrisome aspect of Turkey’s role in Syria. Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield, which went into a hiatus recently since its objectives against Daesh were proclaimed a success. The main purpose of the operation was to oust the Kurdish forces from their enclaves in northeastern Syria, with an alibi that also included aiding in Coalition efforts against Daesh. Click Here to find out how Erdogan’s operations in Kurdish-held Syria may pan out when they eventually become too much at odds with US/Coalition alliances with the Kurdish PYD/SDF?
Although the AKP’s beginnings were stained by the party leader, Erdogan himself, being banned from politics. Its rise to power in 2003 soon coincided with much economic and social growth, but not before being presented with a court case as well as public condemnation by the military. The party also ushered in a resurgence of nationalist and even Ottoman sentiments among the public, which of itself backed the suppression of political dissent and Kurdish representation/identity in parliament. The AKP condemned protests that broke out in 2013 due to anti-Kurdish actions by the government. TFG has covered Turkey’s post-WWI relationship with the Kurdish quest for autonomy. In any case, the 30 year history of violence between the Turkish state and the Kurdish PKK (considered a terrorist group by the US) sets the tone for the AKP’s anti-Kurdish policies within Turkey and its operations in Northern Syria. This truth also exists along with the fact that at one time Erdogan’s AKP worked with Kurdish groups, as they once shared a level of controversy in the eyes of the public and the government.
The Kurdish question alone stirs up plenty of resentment towards the ruling party, but any dissentful act directed at Erdogan in the public eye has produced nothing but fury from the president through pro-party news outlets. In October 2016, Angela Merkel was pressured into carrying out the prosecution of German comedian Jan Bohmermann, who wrote a song in March of that year entitled ‘Erdowie, Erdowo, Erdogan’. The video accompanying the song shows the President’s most absurd public moments like speaking like a cartoon character contrasted with jailing journalists and protesters. As Turkey’s European neighbors have grown more and more concerned about Erdogan’s methods of dealing with dissent, its title as a democratic nation has also come into question.
The failed military coup in July 2016 did just about the opposite with AKP supporters. Actions against the coup were widely supported, even by those who stood against Erdogan. The 2013 military coup in Egypt served as a bad precedent for such attempts, as it did not lead to a democratic state. A sudden turn on an increasingly authoritarian Turkish government didn’t seem like a good turn once it came down to it. And Erdogan used this chance, the image of the violent but defeated opposition to set up a very stark line between loyalists and traitors. Despite the public unrest ultimately resulting in the attempted coup, Erdogan is more popular than ever.
On the Bosphorus Bridge in Istanbul pro-government mobs stomp and whip a group of huddled Turkish defected military personnel.
A compilation of reports released by The Project on Middle East Political Science detailed predictions of more pro-Erdogan sentiment in the country a week after the failed coup. For those who already supported the party, this was bound to happen. With reason to believe that all opposition parties wish to bring down the Turkish state in the way that almost occurred, it is easy for Erdogan to play out the victim to gain support when there is obvious resistance and threat to the AKP’s dominance. By extension, those who support Erdogan are also afraid of being targeted by violent insurgents for their political affiliation.
However, it was a threat to Erdogan’s power closely followed by a revival of power that may have added to the momentum leading up to the coup. Jason Brownlee at the University of Texas at Austin writes:
Erdogan’s current drive, towards a super-powered presidency, is subtler than Turkey’s prior authoritarian periods. Rather than cancelling elections, Erdogan has employed the ballot box to quell his critics… Last June [2015], the electorate denied AKP parliamentarians the majority they had enjoyed since 2002. When neither the AKP nor any other party had formed a government by August, Erdogan called snap elections for that November.
Meanwhile state security forces aggressively battled the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and menaced the AKP’s electoral rival, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). As fear spiked, media coverage and campaigning withered. A climate of insecurity probably helped the AKP rebound, winning half the votes and 58 percent of the seats.
Those who contributed to the analysis of Turkey’s coup attempt predicted such a resurgence of nationalism and loyalism affiliated with the AKP. Pro-referendum “Yes” rallies, most recently on April 14th, have drawn tens of thousands to city centers. The government has bussed voters around to attend demonstrations supporting the referendum and a more powerful Erdogan. “No” rallies also had notable numbers of attendees. Despite the sanctity of the secular, democratic nation’s founder Ataturk, many see Erdogan as a growing theocratic authoritarian dictator. The AKP’s religious affairs department or the Diyanet, stirred up nationalist and religious fervor during and after the coup.
Main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu at a “No” rally.
Erdogan believes that his partner-turned-rival, the Islamist cleric Fethullah Gulan, was behind the coup, and credits any support against himself or the referendum to the US and self-exiled Gulan who now resides in Pennsylvania. It is worth noting that Erdogan views what he perceives as Gulan’s ‘parallel state’ as being consistent with US motives. Without diminishing any influence Gulan may have, those protesting for secular values and a functioning parliamentary democracy are not focusing on him. The Diyanet’s influence during the coup prompted vicious behavior from the party’s civilian vigilante support. Lisel Hintz of Cornell University writes:
Effectively deputized by the president and goaded by religious authorities, groups…coalesced… With many chants of “Ya allah bismallah allahu ekbar” (“In the name of Allah, Allah is great”), sprawling crowds of pro-government Turks confronted armed soldiers en masse, aiding in the rapid vanquishing of coup efforts. Civilian mobs lynched military officers despite some police efforts to protect them; one soldier was reportedly beheaded on the Bosphorous Bridge.
While religious fervor is not uncommonly coupled with political/existential struggle even in the West, the tendencies of Islamist states in periods of political polarization have been to subjugate and brutally crack down on dissent. Erdogan has proven to likely travel down this path further with a less legitimized parliamentary opposition if the referendum is voted in.
As for its effects on the Syrian conflict, Erdogan becomes more openly opposed to US-Kurdish alliances in Syria. It has been reported that the (voting in of) referendum will serve as a kick-off for operations against the Kurdish SDF after a short hiatus. A more direct campaign against US allies in Syria will likely force Erdogan to look for support elsewhere, specifically Russia.
