On February 5th, 2018, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) met to discuss the urgent situation in Idlib province, Syria. Idlib is the site of the largest pockets of Syrian opposition fighters remaining in the country, a mixture of groups including some relatively moderate organizations, some Turkish-backed organizations, and some extremist/terrorist organizations (such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS). On February 3rd, militants from HTS claimed to have fired a Man-Portable Air-Defense System (MANPADS) at a Russian Air Force Sukhoi Su-25SM of the 368th Assault Aviation Regiment (368th ShAP), striking the aircraft and causing the pilot to eject over HTS-held territory. The pilot apparently took shelter and was reportedly in some kind of a shoot-out with HTS militants. Based on pictures of his service pistol after the incident, it appears that his weapon jammed. The militants closed in on him, and he pulled the pin on a hand grenade, killing himself and either injuring or killing several others near him.
What came next can only be described as a wide-scale campaign of collective punishment and retribution by the Russians and their Syrian government allies against civilian and fighter alike across much of Idlib province. Hospitals and other vital infrastructure were targeted, and chlorine gas was deployed. That incident marks the third use of chlorine in Syria in February 2018. Below are excerpts from Russian UN Ambassador Vasily Nebenzya’s comments at the Security Council.
Vasily Nebenzya
The Russian Federation has never contended the use of Sarin in Khan Sheikhoun. What remains a mystery is “who used sarin gas” because the laughable conclusions of the JIM do not persuade us of this.
Russian UN Ambassador Vasily Nebenzya
In addition to implicitly admitting guilt on the part of the Syrian regime (as no opposition forces in Syria have yet proven capable of manufacturing sarin), this line is also patently false. Russian state media outlet Sputnik has on repeated occasions peddled preposterous propaganda slandering the Syrian Civil Defense (the White Helmets) and accusing the opposition, the White Helmets, and the wider Western world of staging a false flag attack. Furthermore, the mystery as to who used sarin gas has already been solved. As stated in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Joint Investigative Mission (OPCW-JIM)’s 7th and final report to the UNSC:
opcw-jim 7th report to the unsc
- The number of persons affected by the release of sarin on 4 April 2017 and that sarin reportedly continued to be present at the site of the crater 10 days after the incident indicate that a large amount of sarin was likely released, which is consistent with it being dispersed via a chemical aerial bomb;
- The symptoms of victims and their medical treatment, as well as the scale of the incident are consistent with a large-scale intoxication of sarin; and
- The sarin identified in the samples taken from Khan Shaykhun was found to have most likely been made with a precursor (DF) from the original stockpile of the Syrian Arab Republic; and
- The irregularities described in annex II are not of such a nature as to call into question the aforementioned findings.
Based on the foregoing, the Leadership Panel is confident that the Syrian Arab Republic is responsible for the release of sarin at Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. The findings of the Leadership Panel regarding the evidence in this case
are based on the information set forth in detail in annex II.
Vasily Nebenzya
Recently there has been a fuss about the alleged incident in the Damascus suburbs with chlorine being used. There are even rumors about Sarin being used. Where? When? By whom?
The incident in question, the August 21st, 2013 sarin gas attack in East Ghouta, Damascus, was recently announced to have been the work of the Syrian regime, along with several other attacks (including the other major sarin attack at Khan Sheikhoun in 2017).
Vasily Nebenzya
Terrorists through so-called “Civic Organizations” closely affiliated with them, above all the lamentably notorious White Helmets are disseminating rumors in social networks which are immediately taken up by Western media outlets and now some representatives at the Security Council are engaging in such rhetoric baselessly accusing the Syrian regime and spreading slander against the Russian Federation.
A member of the White Helmets being treated for chemical weapons exposure
While it does make sense that civic organizations would be among the first to report a chemical weapons attack, and while those reports have been corroborated with video evidence on numerous occasions, the attempt to slander the White Helmets as terrorist affiliates is disgusting at best, and covered more in-depth here by Channel 4.
vasily nebenzya
I’ve already asked, did anybody even think about a basic question ‘why is it necessary to use chemical weapons? Why does the Syrian government need to use chemical weapons? What hypothetically can the Syrian government stand to benefit from this?’
- The strikes launched in recent days (the CW attacks that necessitated this UNSC meeting) were launched in retaliation for the shoot-down of a Russian Su-25, as mentioned previously. If the Russians are looking for a reason, there’s a solid one.
- The Assad regime was ostensibly winning the war in April of 2017 when they dropped sarin on Khan Sheikhoun. Perhaps Assad’s forces, in addition to seeking revenge, are trying to finally bring the war to an end so they can stop “winning” it and actually win it.
- Bashar al-Assad’s regime has been in power since he inherited the country from his father in 2000. The regime’s human rights record is known far-and-wide. Violence and crimes against humanity are not new for Assad, it’s only that the offenses are taking place in plain sight now instead of behind closed doors.
- Warfare has historically seen nearly-victorious parties (or dominant parties) use indiscriminate and massively-destructive weapons against civilian areas on numerous occasions. This is nothing new. But perhaps in order to combat this line (which is so often put forth by the Russians and their Syrian allies) it would be prudent to quote a different Ba’athist, former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, who was similarly discussing the use of chemical weapons (in his case during the Iran-Iraq war):
saddam hussein discussing iranian missile strikes, 12-24 september 1986
Sometimes a person has a certain weapon and the war is about to end. He will say: use all of it, why keep it? The war is going to end anyway, hit them over the head while they are enemies, and we are still at war.
vasily nebenzya
The first thing we need to do, and I mention this here…is to deploy an OPCW fact-finding mission to those areas to conduct an investigation. Where is the presumption of innocence? You, in advance, prior to any investigation are accusing the so-called ‘regime’, quote-unquote, why do you need an independent investigative mechanism? Do you at least remember that any conclusions, any conclusions need to be preceded by an investigation but apparently this is not something which you need. It appears that it should be abundantly clear to all that in capitals which are sending such representatives to the council have no interest in the investigation the need neither fact nor clear accurate evidence.
Impact site of a chlorine munition; note the yellowed/dead grass around the crater
The statements made by the OPCW-JIM prior to their finding Assad’s regime guilty of the Khan Sheikhoun attack were nothing but neutral in every way. As opposed to grandstanding accusations by an angry diplomat before a world body, the OPCW-JIM has relied on verifiable scientific analysis to investigate the aforementioned chemical weapons attacks.
Selected Documents:
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (HRC) REPORTS
A/HRC/25/65 | 12 August 2014
128. In Al-Ghouta, significant quantities of sarin were used in a well-planned indiscriminate attack targeting civilian-inhabited areas, causing mass casualties. The evidence available concerning the nature, quality and quantity of the agents used on 21 August indicated that the perpetrators likely had access to the chemical weapons stockpile of the Syrian military, as well as the expertise and equipment necessary to manipulate safely large amount of chemical agents. Concerning the incident in Khan Al-Assal on 19 March, the chemical agents used in that attack bore the same unique hallmarks as those used in Al-Ghouta.
A/HRC/27/60 | 13 August 2014
116. Witnesses saw helicopters drop barrel bombs and smelled a scent akin to domestic chlorine immediately following impact. Accounts of victims, and of medical personnel involved in administering treatment, provide descriptions of symptoms compatible with exposure to chemical agents, namely vomiting, eye and skin irritation, choking and other respiratory problems.
Reasonable grounds exist to believe that chemical agents, likely chlorine, were used on Kafr Zeita, Al-Tamana’a and Tal Minnis in eight incidents within a 10-day period in April. There are also reasonable grounds to believe that those agents were dropped in barrel bombs from government helicopters flying overhead.
A/HRC/34/64 | 2 February 2017
52. The Commission investigated numerous incidents of allegations of improvised chlorine bombs dropped from helicopters, which resulted in civilian casualties. In none of the incidents reviewed did information gathered suggest the involvement of Russian forces. Given that the incidents reported were all the result of air-delivered bombs, it is concluded that these attacks were carried out by Syrian air forces. The use of chlorine by Syrian forces follows a pattern observed in 2014 and 2015 (see S/2016/738).
54. On 6 September, at approximately 1 p.m., an improvised chlorine bomb was air-delivered in al-Sukkari district. A man and a 13-year-old girl died as a result of asphyxiation, while more than 80 civilians suffered from the effects of chlorine inhalation. Eyewitnesses saw helicopters hovering in the sky when the bomb was dropped, while those in the vicinity began suffocating and their eyes became red shortly afterwards. Witnesses further reported a strong odour resembling domestic detergents. Available footage shows individuals, including women, children and an elderly man, receiving oxygen, and remnants of the improvised chemical munition. The attack was carried out by Syrian forces.
55. Between 8 and 12 December, reports of toxic chemicals being dropped in al-Kalasa neighbourhood emerged daily. One physician treating victims of the attack on 8 December in Al-Kalasa recalled he also treated patients from the Bustan al-Qasr and al-Firdous districts that day. Eyewitnesses saw bombs being dropped by helicopters at around 4 p.m. and a yellow gas leak from the barrels. A pungent accompanying odour was also reported. Thirty-five victims, including women and children, reportedly suffered from symptoms consistent with chlorine inhalation, including hypoxia, bronchospasms and respiratory failure.
56. On 9 December, at around midday, two improvised bombs with chlorine payloads were dropped in Al-Kalasa and Bustan al-Qasr. Thirty civilians suffered from effects consistent with chlorine exposure, and footage obtained confirms children struggling with shortness of breath and teary eyes. On 10 December, doctors reported treating patients from Bustan al-Qasr with similar symptoms. On this occasion, improvised chemical bombs were used directly on al-Hayat clinic, which had been treating victims of chlorine attacks over the previous days. Medical staff and patients suffered symptoms consistent with chlorine exposure, and footage and images assessed are consistent with an air-delivered improvised chlorine bomb.
A/HRC/36/55 | 8 August 2017
67. Between March 2013 and March 2017, the Commission documented 25 incidents of chemical weapons use in the Syrian Arab Republic, of which 20 were perpetrated by government forces and used primarily against civilians. During the reporting period, government forces further used chemical weapons against civilians in the town of Khan Shaykhun, in Al-Latamneh, located approximately 11 kilometres south of Khan Shaykhun, and in eastern Ghouta.
69. At around 6.30 a.m. on 30 March — five days after the chlorine attack on Al-Latamneh hospital by Syrian forces (see para. 64 above) — an unidentified warplane dropped two bombs in an agricultural field south of Al-Latamneh village. Interviewees recalled how the first bomb made almost no sound but released a “toxic material” absent any particular smell, while the second bomb caused a loud explosion. As a result of the former, at least 85 people suffered from respiratory difficulties, loss of consciousness, red eyes and impaired vision. Among the injured were 12 male farmers located 300 metres away from the impact point, 2 of them minors. Nine medical personnel who treated patients without protection also fell ill.
70. While the Commission is unable to identify the exact agent to which the victims of the 30 March incident were exposed, interviewees described certain symptoms, including a very low pulse in one case, and contracted pupils, suffocation, nausea and spasms in another, that indicate poisoning by a phosphor-organic chemical, such as a pesticide or a nerve agent. The absence of a characteristic chlorine odour, coupled with secondary intoxications among medical personnel treating victims, supports the conclusion that a toxic chemical other than chlorine was employed. Given that Syrian and Russian forces were conducting an aerial campaign in the area, the absence of indications that Russian forces have ever used chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, and the repeated use of chemical weapons by the Syrian air force, there are reasonable grounds to conclude that the Syrian air force used chemical weapons in Al-Latamneh on 30 March.
71. As part of its offensive to fully besiege Barza, Tishreen and Qabun (see annex III, para. 3), three rockets were launched on the afternoon of 29 March from government forces positions into a residential area of central Qabun municipality, close to the Al-Hayat hospital, as well as into neighbouring Tishreen. One of the rockets released a white cloud in Qabun and witnesses recalled the spread of gas, which smelled strongly of domestic chlorine. Thirty-five persons were injured, including one woman and two children. Victims exhibited symptoms consistent with chlorine exposure, including respiratory difficulties, coughing and runny noses. The most serious cases were treated with hydrocortisone l and oxygen. On 7 April, shortly after midday, Al-Hayat hospital received two men suffering from milder manifestations of the same symptoms. In the first week of July, government forces used chlorine against Faylaq ar-Rahman fighters in Damascus on three occasions: on 1 July in Ayn Tarma, on 2 July in Zamalka and on 6 July in Jowbar. In total, 46 fighters suffered from red eyes, hypoxia, rhinorrhoea, spastic cough and bronchial secretions.
72. The gravest allegation of the use of chemical weapons by Syrian forces during the reporting period was in Khan Shaykhun. In the early morning of 4 April, public reports emerged that air strikes had released sarin in the town. Dozens of civilians were reported killed and hundreds more injured. Russian and Syrian officials denied that Syrian forces had used chemical weapons, explaining that air strikes conducted by Syrian forces at 11.30 a.m. that day had struck a terrorist chemical weapons depot.
74. Interviewees and early warning reports indicate that a Sukhoi 22 (Su-22) aircraft conducted four air strikes in Khan Shaykhun at around 6.45 a.m. Only Syrian forces operate such aircraft. The Commission identified three conventional bombs, likely OFAB-100-120, and one chemical bomb. Eyewitnesses recalled that the latter bomb made less noise.
French Government Report on Khan Sheikoun Attack
US Government Report on CW Persistence
