The war in Syria is far from over. While the cause of fighting has mutated greatly over the last seven years, and with new belligerents to the conflict fighting over new issues, the situation seems to be on the verge of flaring up further. Several key areas require close attention, but this article is by no means all-inclusive.
assad regime vs. opposition | ghouta
For several weeks now, but increasing greatly after the shoot-down of a Russian Su-25 over Idlib, Assad loyalist forces have bombarded the Ghouta district (along with large areas of Idlib province) in preparation for a final offensive to clear out all opposition forces. The bombardment from the air has been nearly constant, with hundreds (perhaps thousands) being killed since the start of 2018. The violence has been absolutely appalling, with hospitals being targeted deliberately, chemical weapons being employed, and protected populations being directly attacked. In districts Assad’s forces retake, enforced disappearances have been commonplace, with men either forcibly conscripted into Assad’s military/militias or whisked away to torture prisons, likely not to be seen again.
The humanitarian situation in Ghouta and Idlib is appalling, with children taking to social media to beg for assistance from the outside world. Their cries have gone largely unanswered, and despite Turkish efforts to establish a safe zone in Idlib (discussed below), many are still threatened and likely to suffer.
iran vs. united states | eastern deserts
SyAAF Su-22 moments before being shot down
In the barren deserts of eastern Syria a proxy war is steadily turning into a conventional one. Since the election of Donald Trump, tensions between the US and Iran have come to a boiling point, and with the withdrawal of Daesh from Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, disagreements over territorial control have become the primary focus of all of the regional actors. On 18 May 2017, aircraft from Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (US-led coalition against Daesh, henceforth “Coalition”) struck pro-Assad forces near the border town of At Tanf after those forces advanced into an established de-confliction zone (as agreed upon by the US/Russia). While there were no casualties among parties on either side, the incident was unfortunately just a warning of events to come.
Less than a month later, on 6 June Coalition aircraft were again dispatched to the region around At Tanf, this time engaging pro-Assad forces directly and destroying several ground targets. Less than 48 hours later, an American jet was vectored into the area after an Iranian Shahed 129 unmanned aerial vehicle was spotted above Coalition-backed forces (with embedded Western/Jordanian special forces). The UAV was spotted dropping a bomb on the Coalition-backed forces, at which point it was promptly shot out of the sky. June 19th saw the next escalation, this time with a piloted Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) Sukhoi Su-22 being shot down near Ja’Din, south of Tabqah, Syria, after the aircraft attacked members of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). As in previous incidents, the American commander immediately attempted to remediate the situation via the emergency de-confliction line with the Russian command center in Syria, but to no avail. A US Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet was in the area and was vectored in to shoot down the offending aircraft, which it did.
The next day, another Iranian Shahed 129 attempted to attack SDF and Coaltion forces near At Tanf, resulting in an US Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle shooting it down. Finally, on 7 February 2018, pro-Assad forces once again attacked the SDF, this time near Deir ez-Zor. In response, and after several attempts to remediate via the de-confliction line, Coalition forces retaliated. US Marine Corps land artillery was joined by piloted aircraft (B-52, F-15, AC-130U) and unmanned aerial vehicles in a three hour engagement that left 100 out of the 500 attacking fighters dead and many of their armored vehicles destroyed. Rumors of continuing clashes have trickled out on almost a daily basis since then. Among the dead are members of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and possibly dozens of Russian mercenaries from an organization called Wagner PMC.
The battles in the eastern deserts are likely driven by a desire to control Syria’s oil fields, which were until recently funding Daesh. The Coalition’s goal seems to be to control and hold the area long enough to established a new government under the SDF, led by locals, to maintain the zone as part of the SDF’s area of influence. Pro-regime forces, of course, want to prevent this and return the land to Assad’s control. The potential for a major incident, one which could lead to continued clashes between American and pro-Assad/Iranian forces, is very high.
iran/hezbollah vs. israel | Israeli/Syrian border area
IDF F-16 crash site
Since 2012 there have been regular incidents on the Israeli/Syrian border in the Golan Heights area between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and pro-Assad forces (be they Syrian military, government-aligned militia, Hezbollah, Iranian forces, or any others). Israel occupies an interesting position with regards to Syria; a full-fledged government victory puts an Iran/Hezbollah-friendly state (and in some regards almost a puppet state) on their border, whereas an opposition victory could put any number of actors in power, the vast majority of which are hostile to Israel. Thus, Israel has sought to establish a buffer zone around its borders, offering medical care and limited support to local Free Syrian Army groups near the Golan (although the IDF has, on several occasions, also carried out air strikes against FSA groups for attacking Israeli positions).
The IDF has also been utilized to destroy long range missiles handed over to Hezbollah by the Iranians, although recently the strategy has shifted to striking accurate long range missiles (the unspoken bit being that it became impossible to keep tabs on all the regular long range missiles Hezbollah now possesses. On 10 February an Iranian drone (Saegheh UAV) took off from Tiyas (T4) airbase in Homs, Syria, and crossed over the Golan Heights and into Israel proper. It was intercepted by an IDF AH-64A Apache attack helicopter, followed by retaliatory airstrikes against T4 by a flight of eight F-16 Fighting Falcon multirole fighter aircraft. The F-16s destroyed twelve targets on the ground, but were ambushed by a swarm of surface-to-air missiles (SAM) around T4. SA-3, SA-6, SA-17, and S-200 SAM systems launched a barrage of 20 missiles, one of which struck one of the F-16s. The pilots were forced to eject and both they and the aircraft landed in Israeli territory. One of the pilots was seriously injured in either the missile attack or the ensuing ejection, while the other was relatively unharmed.
It is very likely that there will be more instances of violence between the IDF and regime-loyal forces in the near future. The next Israel/Hezbollah war will likely be the bloodiest so far, with Hezbollah finally holding the ability to strike deep into Israeli territory. Israel’s response is sure to be disproportionate.
ypg vs. turkey | afrin canton
Turkish troops in Afrin canton
On 20 January 2018 the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), accompanied by opposition fighters from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, formerly Jabhat al-Nusra/Al Qaeda in Syria), invaded the Kurdish-majority region of Afrin, north of Aleppo. Afrin has been a distant outpost of the Rojava project, and due to the YPG’s proximity to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the People’s Protection Units (YPG) which controls Afrin is a target for Turkey. Kurds in Afrin believe Turkey’s ultimate goal is to ethnically cleanse Afrin, a conspiracy which is given more credence following recent comments made by the Turkish First Lady, Emine Erdogan.
Operation Olive Branch | Yellow = YPG; Red = Assadist; Light Green = FSA; Dark Green = TSK
Intense TSK air strikes have left hundreds of Kurdish fighters and civilians killed. In response to the onslaught, the YPG has sought and will receive military assistance from the Assad regime, apparently in the way of National Defense Force (NDF) militia members. In return, the YPG will assist the regime in retaking the cities of Azaz, al-Bab, and Jarabulus from the FSA/TSK (who captured the cities during Operation: Euphrates Shield).
turkey vs. assad | idlib province
Turkish military convoy in Idlib
Finally, owing to sustained aerial bombardment by the Assad regime and its Russian backers, along with repeated pro-Assad incursions into Idlib province (incursions which are prohibited under an existing ceasefire/de-confliction agreement), Turkey has deployed an increasingly-substantial number of forces in Idlib province itself. As of this writing, several TSK convoys have entered Idlib, establishing six observation posts in eastern Idlib province (more are likely in western Idlib). Turkey’s long-term goals for Idlib province are likely to link it up with Afrin canton and establish a zone for Sunni Syrians to live under TSK protection, which seems to reaffirm worries of ethnic cleansing as mentioned above.
As Turkey increases its footprint in Syria, the chances of a conflict between the TSK and the Syrian military also increases. Owing to Turkey’s NATO membership (and thus its protected status under NATO’s treaty), the United States (despite being at odds with Turkey currently) must pay close attention to the happenings in both Afrin and Idlib. Between Afrin and Idlib, ongoing clashes in the east with American forces against pro-Assad troops, and the repeated skirmishing along the Israeli border, the potential for a global conflagration seeding from the war in Syria is high. It would be prudent to keep a sharp eye on the region in the coming days, weeks, and months.
Idlib province with Turkish observation posts marked
