In an effort to promote understanding and transparency regarding the war in Syria, we have chosen several sets of documents and highlighted important sections. This first batch of documents pertain to the use of chemical weapons.
Documents from the Organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons (OPCW) as pertain to the conflict in syria
Document ID: S/1191/2014 (Archive)
Body: Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
Date: 16 June 2014
Full Title: Summary Report of the Work of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Covering the Period from 3 to 31 May 2014
Summary: OPCW FFM declares it is highly likely that an attack using chlorine as a weapon was carried out in Kafr Zeyta.
Finding:
The FFM has reviewed the information available to it, including that in the public domain relating to the several similar incidents. Some of this information seems to corroborate the testimonies provided by the treating physicians with whom the FFM was able to establish contact. The similarities in the witness accounts reviewed over the course of time became conspicuous. It is for this reason that, despite the high risk involved, the FFM decided to conduct a field visit to Kafr Zeyta—the town that seemed most affected by incidents of use of chlorine and that was most likely to yield evidence that was fresh from the most recent reported attacks. A field visit would have enabled the Team to collect for themselves clinical and environmental evidence and to authenticate information already available in the public domain, including information relevant to the munitions and the possible mode of deployment.
The attack on the Team and the resulting denial of access to the FFM prevents it from presenting definitive conclusions. It is nonetheless the considered view of the FFM that the available information cannot be dismissed as unconnected, random, or of a nature attributable to purely political motives. This information lends credence to the view that toxic chemicals, most likely pulmonary irritating agents such as chlorine, have been used in a systematic manner in a number of attacks.
Document ID: S/1212/2014 (Archive)
Body: Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
Date: 10 September 2014
Full Title: Second Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Key Findings
Summary: OPCW FFM believes “with a high degree of confidence” that chlorine was used as a chemical weapon in Talmanes, Al Tamanah, and Kafr Zeta, and that said weapons were reportedly delivered by helicopter.
Finding:
Thirty-seven testimonies of primary witnesses, representing not only the treating medical professionals but a cross-section of society, as well as documentation including medical reports and other relevant information corroborating the circumstances, incidents, responses, and actions, provide a consistent and credible narrative. This constitutes a compelling confirmation that a toxic chemical was used
as a weapon, systematically and repeatedly, in the villages of Talmanes, Al Tamanah, and Kafr Zeta in northern Syria. The descriptions, physical properties, behaviour of the gas, and signs and symptoms resulting from exposure, as well as the response of the patients to the treatment, leads the FFM to conclude, with a high degree of
confidence, that chlorine, either pure or in mixture, is the toxic chemical in question.
Document ID: S/1319/2015 (Archive)
Body: Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
Date: 29 October 2015
Full Title: Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Regarding Alleged Incidents in the Idlib Governorate of the Syrian Arab Republic Between 16 March and 20 May 2015
Summary: OPCW FFM strongly believes chlorine was used as a weapon in Idlib province.
Finding:
The inability of the team to, inter alia, visit the location shortly after the incident, review original records in situ, take its own samples, and totally control the selection of interviewees detracts from the strength of the conclusions that can be made by the
FFM. However, sufficient facts were collected to conclude that incidents in the Syrian Arab Republic likely involved the use of one or more toxic chemicals— probably containing the element chlorine—as a weapon.
Document ID: S/1510/2017
Body: Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
Date: 29 June 2017
Full Title: Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Regarding an Alleged Incident in Khan Sheikhoun, Syrian Arab Republic April 2017
Summary: OPCW FFM finds “incontrovertible” evidence of the use of Sarin at Khan Sheikhoun
Finding:
The team received limited information on the dispersal mechanism and, therefore, was unable to make firm conclusions on that specific matter. However, the biomedical specimens, of which the FFM had full custody, provided incontrovertible evidence that people were exposed to sarin or a sarin-like substance.
The team concluded that a large number of people, some of whom died, were exposed to sarin. The release that caused exposure was likely to have been initiated in the crater in the road, located close to the silos in the northern part of the town. The team concluded that, based on such a release, the only determination that could be made
was that sarin had been used as a weapon.
Document ID: S/2016/738
Body: Security Council
Date: 24 August 2016
Full Title: Letter dated 24 August 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council
Summary: OPCW reports to Security Council on specific locations wherein it is highly suspected the Syrian military used chemical weapons.
Finding:
42. In most of the chlorine-related cases, the Mechanism had obtained information, in particular witness statements, referring to the presence of aircraft (rotary and fixed-wing) around the time and location of the incidents under investigation. Depending on the time of the incident (daytime/night-time), the witnesses stated that they had either seen or heard the aircraft. The Mechanism repeatedly requested flight logs, situation reports and other documents of the Syrian Arab Armed Forces from the Government. The Government has not yet provided them.
47. Having reviewed the information and evidence available to it, the Leadership Panel is of the view that the Syrian Arab Armed Forces used makeshift weapons deployed from helicopters, including those shaped like a barrel. The Government denies possessing barrel bombs. The Panel notes that further studies would be useful to contrast and compare the various munitions used in the nine cases with the remnants from cases not considered by the Mechanism. In relation to the eight chlorine-related cases, the possibility that the munition hit toxic chemicals on the ground could not be ruled out in some cases, in particular because alleged remnants of the devices at impact locations shown had been removed from those locations before their documentation (see paras. 49-51 below).
54. The Leadership Panel examined the existing information regarding the two impact locations in Talmenes on 21 April 2014. There is sufficient information for the Panel to conclude that the incident at impact location No. 2 was caused by a Syrian Arab Armed Forces helicopter dropping a device causing damage to the structure of a concrete block building and was followed by the release of a toxic substance that affected the population.
56. The Leadership Panel examined the existing information regarding the two impact locations in Sarmin on 16 March 2015. There is sufficient information for the Panel to conclude that the incident at impact location No. 2 was caused by a Syrian Arab Armed Forces helicopter dropping a device that hit the house and was followed by the release of a toxic substance, matching the characteristics of chlorine, that was fatal to all six occupants. The remnants of the device are consistent with the construction of a barrel bomb.
Document ID: S/2016/888
Body: Security Council
Date: 21 October 2016
Title: Letter dated 21 October 2016 from the Leadership Panel of the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations
Joint Investigative Mechanism addressed to the Secretary-General
Summary: Further details Syrian aircraft being used to deliver chemical weapons.
Finding:
18. The Leadership Panel, having examined the information regarding the incident in Qmenas on 16 March 2015, previously determined that a Syrian Arab Armed Forces helicopter had dropped a barrel bomb or other device at impact location No. 1 in Qmenas, identified in annex VII to the third report. Although the Panel was close to having sufficient information to reach a conclusion on the actors involved at the time of submission of the third report, it could not confirm whether the device used had contained explosives or chlorine.
19. The Leadership Panel determines that there is now sufficient information to conclude that the incident at impact location No. 1 was caused by a Syrian Arab Armed Forces helicopter dropping a device from high altitude, which hit the ground and released the toxic substance that affected the population.
27. The Leadership Panel also determined, in the third report and in section III above, that the Syrian Arab Armed Forces had been involved in the use of toxic chemicals as weapons in three cases: Talmenes (21 April 2014), Qmenas (16 March 2015) and Sarmin (16 March 2015). Their helicopters were used to drop barrel bombs in those three cases.
28. During the period in which the incidents under investigation occurred, the Syrian Arab Armed Forces possessed a fleet of rotary-wing aircraft, including transport and combat helicopters, used by the air force and the navy. Furthermore, the Mechanism obtained information that those helicopters could also be accessed by Syrian special forces. The information gathered by the Mechanism further indicated that, in addition to the relocation of air assets owing to the loss of some of the airbases to armed opposition groups, there were constant movements of helicopters from one airbase to another, based on operational needs, in particular of operations on the ground. Air assets have been known to undertake missions from airbases that were not necessarily their permanent base.
29. The helicopter flights in the three cases originated from two government-controlled airbases, as follows:
- Hama airbase, Hama governorate. In the case of Talmenes, the information assessed by the Panel indicates that a helicopter departed from Hama airbase, flew over Talmenes at the time of the incident and dropped a barrel bomb, as indicated in annex IV to the third report.
- Humaymim airbase at Bassel al-Assad International Airport, Ladhiqiyah governorate. In the cases of Qmenas and Sarmin, information assessed by the Panel indicates that two consecutive helicopters, with pilots using call signs beginning with “Bravo”, departed from this airbase, flew over Qmenas and Sarmin, respectively, at the times of the incidents and dropped barrel bombs, as indicated in annexes VII and VIII to the third report.
- The 253 and 255 squadrons, both belonging to the Sixty-third Helicopter Brigade, which were formerly based at Taftanaz, were relocated to the Hama and Humaymim airbases. In addition, the 618 squadron, with navy helicopters, was based at the Humaymim airbase.
Document ID: S/2017/904
Body: Security Council
Date: 26 October 2017
Title: Letter dated 26 October 2017 from the Leadership Panel of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism addressed to the Secretary-General
Summary: Conclusive findings regarding sarin attack on Khan Sheikhoun
Finding:
93. With respect to identifying those responsible, the Leadership Panel has determined that the information that it has obtained constitutes sufficient credible and reliable evidence of the following:
(a) Aircraft dropped munitions over Khan Shaykhun between 0630 and 0700 hours on 4 April 2017;
(b) An aircraft of the Syrian Arab Republic was in the immediate vicinity of Khan Shaykhun between 0630 and 0700 hours on 4 April 2017;
(c) The crater from which the sarin emanated was created on the morning of 4 April 2017;
(d) The crater was caused by the impact of an aerial bomb travelling at high velocity;
(e) A large number of people were affected by sarin between 0630 and 0700 hours on the morning of 4 April 2017;
(f) The number of persons affected by the release of sarin on 4 April 2017,and the fact that sarin reportedly continued to be present at the site of the crater10 days after the incident, indicate that a large amount of sarin was likely released, which is consistent with its being dispersed through a chemical aerial bomb;
(g) The symptoms of the victims and their medical treatment, as well as the scale of the incident, are consistent with large-scale sarin poisoning;
(h) The sarin identified in the samples taken from Khan Shaykhun was found to have most likely been made with a precursor (DF) from the original stockpile of the Syrian Arab Republic;
(i) The irregularities described in the present annex are not of such a nature as to call into question the aforementioned findings.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Leadership Panel is confident that the Syrian Arab Republic is responsible for the release of sarin at Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. The findings of the Leadership Panel regarding the evidence in this case are based
on the information set forth in detail in the present annex.
