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Global Crisis Watch — September 2018

Protesters in Basra, Iraq

 

The Iraqi Army has no reserves. That means whenever the Iraqi Army (IA) is forced to deploy anywhere in the country, they are moving forces from a different location that needs to be secured. Most of the IA forces are tied down policing or securing formerly Daesh-held territory. The IA has also never had a very strong presence in Basra; when Daesh rose and the IA was redeployed to defend Baghdad, local gangs and Shia militias (Hashd al-Shaabi or Popular Mobilization Units, henceforth PMU) took over. In 2016, they forced elements of the IA 9th Armored Division out of Basra. It is territory they hold and dominate, and pushing the PMUs out of the city, as it appears the citizens are asking the IA/ISF to do, would be incredibly difficult.

Iranian Fateh-110 rocket being fired at Iranian-Kurdish targets in Iraqi Kurdistan

Iran, however, will need to pour considerable resources into the area in an attempt to secure it. The Iranian people, already frustrated by the vast sums of money being spent in Syria (which as thus-far equaled the 2017 Iranian defense budget in its entirety), combined with continued economic stagnation and isolation, has led to a series of protests that have continued off and on since December 2017. Iranian soldiers and proxy soldiers have also been getting killed at an astonishing rate in Syria; Israeli airstrikes against Iranian targets in Syria have become a weekly (or more frequent) occurrence. This is due to Israel’s desire to prevent Iranian proxies and Hezbollah from collecting large numbers of accurate long-range missiles near Israel’s borders. Iran backs dozens of proxy groups of foreign fighters in Syria, all of them dependent on Tehran’s funding. Israel sees this as a major threat, and responds accordingly.

Protesters in Ma’an Al-Nu’man

Elsewhere in Syria, the regime of Bashar al-Assad is preparing to finish retaking all territory previously held by Syrian opposition forces (not including Kurdish-held territory). Assad’s forces, backed by Iranian IRGC units, Iranian funding, Hezbollah and other foreign militia personnel, plus Russian air and limited ground/naval support, are likely to employ indiscriminate weapons in the final assault on Idlib province. These weapons will include cluster munitions, white phosphorus, vacuum bombs, barrel bombs, and likely chemical weapons. Unlike previous battles in Syria, wherein the defeated parties were offered passage to Idlib province, there is nowhere to retreat to after Idlib falls. This means refugees, to the order of three million, will be likely to cross the Turkish border, something Turkey will do little to stop, as the refugees are unlikely to stop in Turkey. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, previously Jabhat al-Nusra and tied in a roundabout way to Al Qaeda (previously directly tied), is likely to strike out for the first time at Western targets as their empire in Idlib crumbles. They will also likely try to embed themselves in with refugees, exacerbating terror problems in Europe and giving further fuel to far-right nationalist governments.

Turkish military forces moving into Idlib, Syria

Turkey has stated it would, among other measures, be relocating Free Syrian Army (FSA) rebels who had joined previous Turkish-backed operations against the Kurdish YPG to Idlib province to fight the government and its backers. Put simply, the battle for Idlib will likely be incredibly bloody, and when it ends, it will see a weakened Turkish presence in Afrin canton, something the YPG is likely to exploit. At the same time, in order to counter the large numbers of hardened fighters in Idlib, the Assad regime will rely on Russian air support for much of the campaign. The Russian Aerospace Forces (RuAF) aircraft are capable of carrying out strikes with a precision level unattainable by the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF). The RuAF will continue to target hospitals and support infrastructure for the civilian population in order to drive the opposition fighters and foreign jihadists out.

Ukrainian tank driving in Donetsk

As Russia prepares to act in Syria, it is also preparing to act in Ukraine. Following the bombing of Donetsk People’s Republic Prime Minister Alexander Zakharchenko by unknown forces, both signatories of the 2015 Minsk II accords, which eventually saw a dramatic decrease in violence in east Ukraine, are either dead or no longer in power. Russia is embarking on an exercise, the largest in their history (2nd largest if you include the USSR), known as Vostok 2018 (East 2018). But instead of showing up in the eastern parts of the country, many of the vehicles being supposedly dispatched for Vostok 2018 are arriving in the Russian border town of Rostov, near Ukraine, whereupon they are taken off their trains and either loaded onto trucks or are otherwise spotted crossing the Ukrainian border. These actions, combined with a dramatic increase in the number of Russian strategic reconnaissance flights over Crimea, point heavily to the notion that Russia will soon act in Ukraine, possibly to take the city of Mariupol on the Sea of Azov.

The world remains on the verge of greater conflict than it has seen in decades. It remains incredibly important to follow news coming out of these various conflict zones in the coming weeks and months. We will try to keep you updated as best as possible.