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Missile Defense Review: Trump’s Six Points for a New Strategy

Trump spoke at the Pentagon on Jan. 17 concerning the DoD's 2019 Missile Defense Review.
Photo Credit - Associated Press

Thursday morning at 11 AM EST, an address at the Pentagon unveiling the US’s new missile defense strategy was given by President Trump, preceded by Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan and Vice President Pence.

Overall, the Missile Defense Review (MDR) summarizes the goals in developing missile defense technology and the policy that rules the decision-making concerning its acquisition and deployment. The MDR deals with developing strategies to outpace and deter our adversaries, such as Iran and North Korea, and our competitors, such as Russia and China, in the field of missile deployment and defense. The development of hypersonic and cruise missiles has become a major concern in recent years and therefore the technology to intercept active missiles and the policy to deter their development must be developed and adopted by the US and its allies.

Shanahan opened the address with a succinct summary of the speech to follow. He warned of the increased development and proliferation of missiles over other means of offense/defense by Russia and China. In addition, the DefSec announced that the development of space-based missile defense would become a top defense priority and will be included in the next proposed budget.Pence and Trump both made sure to mention their deep condolences for the families of those killed in a suicide bombing in Manbij, Syria claimed by the Islamic State group.

Before announcing the Pentagon’s six major changes in its missile defense strategy, Trump spoke for about five minutes about the “humanitarian and security crisis” along the US’s southern border with Mexico, pledging that a physical barrier would, “Stop human hijacking. Stop drugs. Stop gangs. Stop criminals.” He blames congressional democrats for the 27-day long government shutdown.

Trump’s six points for a new missile defense strategy, based of a more detailed DoD report, are as follows:

  • 1. We will prioritize the defense of the American people above all else. Our review calls for 20 new ground-based interceptors [GBI] at Fort Greeley, Alaska [total of 64] and new radars and sensors to immediately detect foreign missiles… We are committed to establishing a missile defense program that can shield the every city … We will never negotiate away our right to do this.
  • 2. We will focus on developing new technology…
  • 3. We will protect the American people from all types of missile attacks… The US will now adjust its posture to also defend against… cruise and hypersonic missiles.
  • 4. We will recognize that space is a new war fighting domain with the Space Force leading the way. My upcoming budget will invest in a space-based missile defense layer.
  • 5. We will remove bureaucratic obstacles to dramatically speed up the acquisition and deployment of the new technology.
  • 6. We will insist on fair [financial] burden-sharing with our allies [NATO]… In furtherance of this goal…the Department of Defense [will] prioritize the sale of American missile defense and technology to our allies and to our partners. We will also leverage our network of partnerships to share early warning and tracking information…

In his address, Trump often strayed from more technical details in favor of posturing and projecting US military might as well as his grievances concerning our allies and adversaries. Without much editorializing, the statement released by the DoD discloses key principles and improvements to be made to current missile defense policies, programs, and capabilities. The language of deterrence was seemingly lost on Trump despite the DoD’s claim that it will “Rely on nuclear deterrence to address large and sophisticated Russian and Chinese intercontinental missile capabilities.”

While Trump and the writers for the DoD’s publication assert the existence of GBIs, plans to install more, as well as plans to develop better kill vehicles to assist those GBIs, it is unclear whether they are accurate and operable. The same logic should be applied when confronted with the MDR’s stated goals to,

  • [Improve] the performance of existing sensors and deploying new missile tracking and discrimination sensors in Alaska and Hawaii…
  • Strengthening regional missile defense posture through the deployment of additional Patriot, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, and Aegis interceptor systems

While the US certainly has the infrastructure and the technology at hand, it has not been properly tested in a way that would properly assess its accuracy and ability to intercept ICBM in the way the President and the DoD says it would.

One may be tempted to compare our ground-based interceptor technology to that of the Raytheon Iron Dome missile defense system. While they may use vaguely similar means to execute similar objectives, to intercept missiles/rockets, the one overt difference between the two is their range or the scale at which they operate. Iron Dome’s range is anywhere between 4 and 70 km (2.5-44 mi), a scale dwarfed by the concept of inter-continental missile defense, which has to factor in not only the distance from which the missile is launched, but also the factor of altitude. ICBMs, depending on the distance they have to travel, reach an altitude of 1,000-2,500 km (621-1553 mi), piercing the atmosphere well before they arch and begin descending towards their target.

The only interceptor tests that have proved successful were the 2007 White Sands, NM tests in which our systems were able to detect and neutralize a rocket in “boost-phase” with an AIM-9X Sidewinder missile. “Boost-phase” refers to the first of three phases in a missile launch before it has pierced the the atmosphere and reached its apex, or “midcourse” phase, followed by the “terminal” phase in which the missile plummets towards its target. Interception at the of the latter two phases has not been successfully tested and the likelihood of interception at boost phase with GBIs lauched from the US mainland at, say North Korea or Russia, is slim.

What the new DoD Missile Defense Review suggests is a program much like the Star Wars program that never came to fruition during the Reagan administration. Space-based missile defense which includes radar sensors and high-energy laser technology, are certainly a feasible goal assuming the project is properly backed financially, but at this time such systems are under-developed and fantastical to say the least. Such is the proposal of equipping F-35s with similar capabilities to neutralize missile threats in their boost phase.

What has been tested are the capabilities of Raytheon SM-3 Block IIA interceptors, but only in controlled settings with targets in boost phase and not with test missiles at the midcourse or terminal phases of launch. Although the MDR does state “The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will test the SM-3 Blk IIA against an ICBM-class target in 2020.” Below are two videos by Raytheon. One shows the first SM-3 test launch in which a target was intercepted, the other depicts Raytheon’s Global Protection Network as it relates to NATO’s missile defense system as of 2013.


SM-3 Block IIA destroys target in first intercept from land (Dec. 2018)

Raytheon’s Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Provide Layered Defense Around the World (2013)

The AN/TPY-2 radars and the SM-3 are only capable of intercepting intermediate (not intercontinental) range missiles as indicated by the testing that has already taken place. The US may have the capability to locate and track the launch of a ballistic missile, but our ability to neutralize a target missile being launched from an adversary thousands of miles away is unsubstantiated.

Trump’s statement at the Pentagon on Thursday and the Defense Department’s Missile Defense Review document propose the use of technologies that are either undeveloped, untested, or at this time pure fantasy. Their existence unfortunately does not ensure our safety, and the US’s attempt at posturing to suggest otherwise could prove dangerous in the event of an actual emergency.