In late 2016, the focus of the war in Syria turned to the nation’s largest city, Aleppo. Aleppo was seen as the turning point in the war, and if it had fallen to the opposition it is likely the Bashar al-Assad regime would have fallen with it. Thus, it was seen as a key location to control. The Battle for Aleppo represents a microcosm of sorts, demonstrating the ferocity and cruelty with which the Assad regime pursues its enemies. As the Syrian government offensive into Idlib province looms, it is important to look back on previous battles to understand how the future onslaught will be handled. This article examines and pulls heavily from A/HRC/34/64, a UN Human Rights Council regarding the fall of Aleppo.
First, a glossary of some of the acronyms that will be used in this article:
FSA | Free Syrian Army | Catch-all umbrella term for armed Syrian opposition groups (note: not all anti-government activists are members of armed groups); encompasses everything from moderate/secular organizations to more hard-line groups, including jihadists (save for those listed below)
SAA | Syrian Arab Army | The armed land forces of the Syrian Arab Republic; largely ineffective by 2016, relying heavily on forced conscription and local militias (along with extensive outside support)
SyAAF | Syrian Arab Air Force | The air forces of the Syrian Arab Republic; equipped with aging Soviet aircraft, both fixed and rotary-wing
RuAF | Russian Aerospace Forces | The air forces of the Russian Federation; deployed to Syria starting in 2015, equipped with advanced weapons and a vast array of Russian military aircraft, from fighters to support aircraft to strategic bombers and helicopters
YPG | People’s Protection Forces | Kurdish militia occupying the Sheikh Maqsoud district of northern Aleppo; Not strictly allied with SAA, but not on friendly terms with FSA (and in conflict with several FSA groups)
JaN | Jabhat al-Nusra | At the time of the Battle for Aleppo, the group was called Jabhat Fatah al-Sham; Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria which had disavowed ties with the organization prior to the final battle for the city.
The Battle for Aleppo was not a classic battle between two armies. On the contrary, it was a multi-sided battle of attrition, with the Assad government and its Russian allies being the most heavily-armed faction. It is important to note that when referring to crimes committed by “multiple sides” in this article, it is implied unless otherwise noted that the Assad regime’s use of force causes far more casualties than use of force by any other actor in the conflict, if for no other reason than the military capabilities of each side. That is to say, despite the fact that elements of the FSA did fire mortars into civilian neighborhoods of Western Aleppo, the damage done cannot be equated to the damage done to Eastern Aleppo by the Assad regime and its allies.
In the lead-up to the final battle for the city, a cessation of hostilities had been declared on 9 September 2016 following months of sustained bombardment by Russian and Syrian aircraft. While the cessation did see a reduction in violence in the city, it was by no means perfect and was frequently violated by multiple parties (but primarily the SAA and JaN). This led to the complete collapse of the agreement on 19 September and a resumption in full-fledged hostilities.
indiscriminate use of force
Despite the variance in military capabilities, one commonality between both the SAA/RuAF and the FSA/JaN was the indiscriminate, disproportionate use of violence in civilian areas with little-to-no regard for non-combatant safety. In terms of aerial bombardment, which only took place on behalf of regime forces (no opposition forces employed an armed air force in the Battle for Aleppo), lower-tech attacks were typically the work of the SyAAF, whereas more technical bombings (or those taking place at night) were almost exclusively RuAF operations.
besieging aleppo
Aleppo never fell completely under FSA control. Governed by a patchwork of local councils and protected by an equally sporadic grouping of armed groups, Aleppo saw an influx of fighters from across the country after 2012. These fighters, while often not locals themselves, nonetheless believed that holding Aleppo was the key to winning the country as a whole. When Russia entered the conflict in earnest in September 2015, it did so by immediately launching a campaign of airstrikes across Aleppo city and in surrounding neighborhoods. This forced opposition elements out of the city and into the countryside around it for protection, thus weakening the defenses of the city proper. Further airstrikes constricted the number of passages into and out of opposition-held East Aleppo, and SAA units were steadily reinforced by their foreign allies, including the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Hezbollah, and various Afghan and Iraqi Shia militias. With the fall of the Castello road in Northern Aleppo in July 2016, the encirclement of East Aleppo was complete.
Attacks on civilian infrastructure | hospitals
Throughout the final six months of the Battle for Aleppo, hospitals in the Eastern part of the city came under sustained, concentrated bombardment. Not a single hospital remained in operation by the time government forces recaptured the city. It is important to note that hospitals, ambulances, and medical personnel are granted protection under international humanitarian law, prohibiting parties to a conflict from attacking them. There is a provision for attacking the aforementioned protected units/individuals if they are being used for military purposes, and then only when prior warning has been given first. Hospitals may, but are not required to, display an emblem to signify the protected status of the location. In the case of Aleppo, hospitals were initially marked with emblems to identify them as medical facilities. Despite this, and despite the fact that there were no military targets near any hospitals (nor any warning given to the hospitals pre-strike), hospitals in East Aleppo came under attack.
Repeated bombardments, lack of warnings and the absence of military presence in the vicinity of the health-care facilities strongly suggest the deliberate and systematic targeting of medical infrastructure as part of a strategy to compel surrender, amounting to the war crime of intentionally targeting protected objects. Furthermore, deliberate attacks against medical staff and ambulances amount to the war crimes of intentionally attacking medical personnel and transport.
Paragraph 32, A/HRC/34/64
The report pays particular attention to one hospital, known as the M10 hospital, located next to the Khalid Ibn Waleed mosque in the al-Sakhour district. The facility was the largest trauma hospital in East Aleppo until it was knocked out of action by four airstrikes in relatively rapid succession.
- 28 September | RBK-500 cluster bomb strikes near building, killing 12 y/o boy and injuring his father; Damaged intensive care unit, destroyed generators and storage facilities.
- 1 October | Series of airstrikes hit hospital, forcing 100 patients/staff into basement. Two patients killed/13 injured, as well as one ambulance destroyed. Hospital knocked temporarily out of action. Attack consisted of one “bunker-buster” bomb (may have been a regular fragmentation bomb), cluster munitions, and chlorine.
- 3 October | Near-miss of aerial bomb causes damage to hospital entrance, destroys maternity ward; Also kills three maintenance staff and injured four medical staff. Weapon was between 500-1000 kg in size.
- 14 October | Hospital struck a fourth time by multiple high-explosive aerial bombs; explosions severely burned two doctors and a pharmacist.
Another prominent example is the al-Hakim pediatric hospital, located in the al-Shaar district (next to the al-Zahra women’s hospital, the al-Bayan hospital, and the al-Daqaq clinic, as well as the central blood bank).
As the only children’s hospital in eastern Aleppo, multiple air strikes on al-Hakim hospital had a devastating impact on children’s access to health care. On 23 July, an air strike damaged the building and caused a power cut, that led to the death of four newborns in incubators. In an attempt to protect patients, the hospital was moved underground. Until
this point, all hospitals in al-Shaar had been clearly marked, after which emblems were removed out of fear of being targeted.On 30 September, at around 5.30 a.m., at least one air strike hit the vicinity of al-Hakim, destroying an ambulance and killing an ambulance driver. Another air strike on 16 November partially destroyed the hospital and killed 27 people in the area. Two days later, on 18 November, the hospital was struck again while patients of a suspected chlorine attack in the Ard al-Hamra district were being treated. A “double-tap” attack was carried out within minutes, forcing the hospital to cease operating
Medical staff confirmed there were no military installations in the area of al-Hakim hospital. One source admitted that wounded fighters received medical treatment in the same hospitals as civilians, but denied the presence of military targets around the hospital. The treatment of wounded fighters does not render a hospital a valid military objective.
paragraphs 33-35, a/hrc/34/64
Use of prohibited weapons | Chlorine
Chlorine is widely available in Syria due to its utility in water treatment. Numerous instances of the use of chlorine as a chemical weapon were recorded in the Battle for Aleppo. Every instance of chlorine use which was reported to investigators involved the use of an air-delivered munition. There is no evidence to support the idea that the RuAF, at any time, delivered chemical munitions. Thus, the only culprit with helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft in the area is the SyAAF. The SyAAF has previously been charged by the UN with using chlorine as a weapon (S/2016/738). Recorded instances of chlorine use as documented by the UN in the final months of the Battle for Aleppo included:
- 6 September | Helicopter-delivered improvised chlorine bomb dropped on al-Sukkari district; one man, one child killed, more than 80 others suffered from chlorine inhalation.
- 8 – 12 December | Chlorine attacks reported on al-Kalasa, Bustan al-Qasr, and al-Firdous districts.
- 9 December | Chlorine attacks reported on al-Kalasa and al-Firdous.
In addition to violating the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, the use of chemical weapons in residential areas, including chlorine bombs which are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets, constitute war crimes.
paragraph 53, a/hrc/34/64
Chlorine, when used as a weapon, is useful for forcing victims out of basements and bomb shelters (as the chlorine itself will settle). It causes inflammation of the lungs and throat, as well as severe eye irritation. Extended exposure is fatal, but the lower immediate fatality rate than other weapons (like sarin) means chlorine is less likely to attract international attention.
use of prohibited weapons | cluster and incendiary munitions
Throughout the Battle for Aleppo, indiscriminate weapons were the norm. Cluster munitions, such as the Russian RBK-500 bomb, release hundreds of bomblets (ShOAB-0.5 in the case of the RBK-500, which releases 565 of them); the bomblets are thrown over a wide area, and frequently many of them fail to explode immediately, presenting a lasting problem for civilians in the area. While Syria is not a party to the international Convention on Cluster Munitions, “the use of cluster munitions in densely-populated areas is inherently indiscriminate and therefore prohibited by customary international humanitarian law. For this reason, their use in cities such as Eastern Aleppo constitutes the war crime of indiscriminate attacks in a civilian populated area.” (Paragraph 57, A/HRC/34/64)
In addition to cluster munitions, white phosphorus was also deployed in a manner inconsistent with international humanitarian law.
Syrian and/or Russian forces also used cluster incendiary munitions in eastern Aleppo. While the Syrian Arab Republic has not ratified the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects or the Protocol III thereto prohibiting the use of incendiary weapons, the use of such weapons in a civilian populated area constitutes the war crime of indiscriminate attacks, and means and methods of warfare which cause incidental loss of life. In addition to international humanitarian law obligations, the Russian Federation has been a party to the Convention since 1982, when it was ratified by the Soviet Union.
Paragraph 59, a/hrc/34/64
Citizens of East Aleppo were not simply victims of the Assad regime and its patrons; beyond that, they were also routinely abused by some of the armed groups that had moved into the area. The worst offenders were Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki, Jaish al-Mujahideen, Aljabha al-Shamiya, Ahrar al-Sham, Fastaqim Kama Umirt Union, and the Sultan Murad Brigades (as well as others not named in the UN report). Combined, these factions comprised of approximately 6,000-8,000 fighters, plus an additional 150-200 fighters from Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (Jabhat al-Nusra’s name during the Battle for Aleppo). While the armed groups did form an alliance (Fatah Haleb/Aleppo Conquest) prior to the final battle, it was largely inactive/non-functional in terms of actual coordination. Citizens reported nepotism/favoritism among armed groups when it came to conflict resolution and aid distribution; freedom of movement was denied, civilian buildings were used for military purposes, and citizens were barred from escaping, making them human shields.
attack on humanitarian workers | aid convoy attack
On 19 September 2016, a United Nations/Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) convoy of 31 trucks requested, and obtained, permission from government authorities to make a delivery to the SARC warehouse in Orum al-Kubra. The vehicles, filled with food, medicine, children’s clothing, and other critical supplies, were accompanied by humanitarian aid workers from the UN/SARC. The delivery took place during a ceasefire which, while imperfect, should have prevented attacks from the RuAF/SyAAF on anybody other than JaN. At around 1:30 PM, the 42 SARC staff and other humanitarian workers started unloading the trucks while aircraft circled overhead. The Russian government later released drone video of the convoy, meaning at least some of those aircraft were Russian. Five hours later, at around 6:30 PM, an alert went out that aircraft were again circling the area. Helicopters had been spotted heading toward the facility as well. At 7:10 PM, the attack commenced.
The helicopters, aging Mil Mi-8 Hip transport aircraft, arrived shortly after the General Command of the Syrian Armed Forces released a statement calling an end to the ceasefire, dropped barrel bombs on both the warehouse and a nearby house. As first responders rushed to the scene, the helicopters circled back and dropped another round of explosives, before a Sukhoi Su-24M Fencer-D attack aircraft returned and dropped at least one RBK-500 cluster bomb, two OFAB 250-270 unguided bombs, and dozens of S-5CB anti-personnel rockets, finally departing the scene only after strafing survivors with their cannons. The sound of the jet engines faded, and 17 of the 31 trucks sat torn to shreds. Along with them, 14 aid workers were dead or dying, and 15 others were wounded. Nearly every member of the team was injured in some way.
The types of munitions used, the breadth of the area targeted and the duration of the attack strongly suggest that the attack was meticulously planned and ruthlessly carried out by the Syrian air force to purposefully hinder the delivery of humanitarian aid and target aid workers, constituting the war crimes of deliberately attacking humanitarian relief personnel, denial of humanitarian aid and targeting civilians.
paragraph 88, a/hrc/34/64
never again, again | The fall of aleppo
Starting at the end of November, opposition forces in Aleppo began to collapse. As government forces took control of neighborhoods, they forcibly began separating men from women, screening the men for fighters and sending those identified as such to prison facilities. Those who were not detained, including boys as young as 16, were forcibly conscripted into the Syrian military. Humanitarian workers began reporting threats and harassment when attempting to assist the refugees streaming out of the ruined eastern half of the city. Reports of executions also filtered out. SAA personnel were said to have executed family members of theirs who had been supportive of the opposition, and families of opposition fighters and commanders were reportedly executed as well (including women, children, and the elderly). Looting was so widespread as to become the norm. Finally, thousands of civilians were “evacuated” to other, opposition-held parts of Syria at gunpoint. These evacuation “deals” amount to the war crime of forced displacement of a civilian population.
