One of the most frequently-repeated myths surrounding the war in Syria has been the idea of the United States (and in some cases the United Kingdom and others are thrown in) being absolutely set on seeing the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime. From questionable media talking heads to mediocre podcasts, one of the most common themes is that of a frustrated America impotently lobbing missiles at the Assad regime’s airbases after what they call “false flag” chemical weapons attacks. Surely America is itching for a fight, eager to utilize any legal justification to attack Assad and strike a blow against Iranian interests in the region, right?
The American war against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), which began in 2014, is legally controversial to say the very least. In terms of domestic law, former President Barack Obama cited the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) when authorizing those first airstrikes.
…The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorst attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.
2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)
However, considering the fact that ISIS had no role in the 9/11 attacks, nor did any of the founders of said organization, the justification is shaky at best. The international fallout from the 2003 Iraq invasion has dictated, at least so far, that the United States must seek international approval prior to launching military operations. Furthermore, Obama was elected on a platform of ending the then-ongoing Iraq war, and his foreign policy reflected a sense of strategic caution. In 2011, the United States moved against Muammar Gaddafi in Libya only after receiving immense pressure from NATO allies (namely France and the UK). Even then, the United States maintained a largely support role, preferring to allow other nations to take a more primary/active role than previously witnessed in international operations (such as those in the Balkans).
Thus, one would expect the US to seek international approval prior to any intervention in Syria. Yet as the war continued to grow in brutality throughout 2011 and 2012, the US stood by idle, providing token assistance to a few select Free Syrian Army groups, but nothing substantial or game-changing. In fact, the US went so far as to prohibit its allies from sending Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems (MANPADS, shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles). On 21 August 2013, a large-scale chemical weapons attack occurred in the Damascus suburb of Eastern Ghouta. The attack, perpetrated by the Assad regime, sparked international outrage. Just one year prior (almost to the day), President Obama had remarked that “We have been very clear to the Assad regime — but also to other players on the ground — that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus; that would change my equation.”
Within hours of the attack, government buildings in Damascus were reportedly evacuated in anticipation of American air strikes. Saudi warplanes sat waiting on the tarmac, but at the last moment, a vote in the UK Parliament refusing to commit UK forces to action against Assad (coupled with a lack of domestic support) caused Obama to get cold feet. He cancelled the planned military operation against the Syrian regime following an agreement between the Assad regime and the international community, brokered by Russia.
On 27 September 2013, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2118. The resolution called for, among other things:
Decides, in the event of non-compliance with this resolution, including unauthorized transfer of chemical weapons, or any use of chemical weapons by anyone in the Syrian Arab Republic, to impose measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;
UNSCR 2118
Chapter VII of the UN Charter is the portion that deals with sanctions and military action. Thus, it could be argued that, should another chemical weapons attack occur after 21 September 2013, the UNSC had sort of authorized military action. This tacit endorsement would have offered far more legal justification for war than the utter lack of international approval in Iraq in 2003, along with the 2014 war against ISIS. But when there was no response to the initial chemical weapons attack, it appears the Assad regime learned a lesson, one it directed at the opposition civilians: Nobody is coming for you. Nobody is here to help. We can do whatever we want to you, and nobody will help you.
Chemical weapons attacks continued in the aftermath of UNSCR 2118, albeit typically utilizing chlorine instead of sarin (easier to claim chlorine use by opposition forces/no law against importing or storing chlorine). Less than a year after UNSCR 2118 was signed, following reports of a chlorine attack against civilians in Kafr Zeyta, another report declared the following:
It is nonetheless the considered view of the FFM that the available information cannot be dismissed as unconnected, random, or of a nature attributable to purely political motives. This information lends credence to the view that toxic chemicals, most likely pulmonary irritating agents such as chlorine, have been used in a systematic manner in a number of attacks.
S/1191/2014
If Obama was looking for any justification he could get his hands on in order to depose Assad and build a pipeline (or whatever the conspiracy claims), it seems S/1191/2014 may have provided it. But perhaps the Americans were looking for something more concrete. Three months after S/1191/2014 was released, it was followed up by S/1212/2014, which states:
Thirty-seven testimonies of primary witnesses, representing not only the treating medical professionals but a cross-section of society, as well as documentation including medical reports and other relevant information corroborating the circumstances, incidents, responses, and actions, provide a consistent and credible narrative. This constitutes a compelling confirmation that a toxic chemical was used as a weapon, systematically and repeatedly, in the villages of Talmanes, Al Tamanah, and Kafr Zeta in northern Syria. The descriptions, physical properties, behaviour of the gas, and signs and symptoms resulting from exposure, as well as the response of the patients to the treatment, leads the FFM to conclude, with a high degree of confidence, that chlorine, either pure or in mixture, is the toxic chemical in question.
S/1212/2014
The report also goes into detail about the delivery system reported, being helicopters with crude barrel bombs rigged under the wings. As the opposition had no access to air power, this would have provided the US with undeniable proof that the Assad regime was using chemicals, in violation of UNSCR 2118. Yet the US sat by and did little. But maybe the US just really doesn’t care about chlorine. Maybe America wanted to be sure it was sarin or another nerve agent before committing troops/warplanes to combat.
The team concluded that a large number of people, some of whom died, were exposed to sarin. The release that caused exposure was likely to have been initiated in the crater in the road, located close to the silos in the northern part of the town. The team concluded that, based on such a release, the only determination that could be made was that sarin had been used as a weapon.
S/1510/2017
However, when S/1510/2017 was released following the April 2017 Khan Sheikhoun chemical attack, there was still no US move to depose Assad. True, American warplanes launched token airstrikes against Shayrat Airbase, but the damage done was rapidly repaired and did nothing to prevent the regime from using chemical weapons again. Maybe the Americans were just waiting for something more conclusive, something that comes out and says plainly that Assad is in violation of UNSCR 2118. If that were the case, S/2017/904 would have been the greatest gift to the United States, for it does not mince words:
93. With respect to identifying those responsible, the Leadership Panel has determined that the information that it has obtained constitutes sufficient credible and reliable evidence of the following:
(a) Aircraft dropped munitions over Khan Shaykhun between 0630 and 0700 hours on 4 April 2017;
(b) An aircraft of the Syrian Arab Republic was in the immediate vicinity of Khan Shaykhun between 0630 and 0700 hours on 4 April 2017;
(c) The crater from which the sarin emanated was created on the morning of 4 April 2017;
(d) The crater was caused by the impact of an aerial bomb travelling at high velocity;
(e) A large number of people were affected by sarin between 0630 and 0700 hours on the morning of 4 April 2017;
(f) The number of persons affected by the release of sarin on 4 April 2017,and the fact that sarin reportedly continued to be present at the site of the crater 10 days after the incident, indicate that a large amount of sarin was likely released, which is consistent with its being dispersed through a chemical aerial bomb;
(g) The symptoms of the victims and their medical treatment, as well as the scale of the incident, are consistent with large-scale sarin poisoning;
(h) The sarin identified in the samples taken from Khan Shaykhun was found to have most likely been made with a precursor (DF) from the original stockpile of the Syrian Arab Republic;
(i) The irregularities described in the present annex are not of such a nature as to call into question the aforementioned findings.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Leadership Panel is confident that the Syrian Arab Republic is responsible for the release of sarin at Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. The findings of the Leadership Panel regarding the evidence in this case are based on the information set forth in detail in the present annex.
S/2017/904
If the United States were really dying to attack and depose Assad, it would likely have taken any one of the numerous convenient legal opportunities to do so. And as the 2018 airstrikes on Assadist forces and Russian military contractors proved, fear of Russian retaliation hardly factors into the US lack of action in Syria. The real answer is that the US government, be it under Barack Obama or Donald Trump, would rather deal with authoritarians than uncertainty; that for all the calls for Assad to step down and the rhetoric at the UN, the United States has been reluctant to take meaningful action against the Assad regime since day one. Considering the statements made by Donald Trump in the past, and the recent statements of every Democratic candidate, it is unlikely that American policy with regards to Syria will take on a more meaningful, moral, or righteous tone anytime soon.
