There are multiple factors that led to Russia becoming involved in Syria. Looking at the subject through a realist lens, Putin and the decision makers in Moscow were motivated to intervene in the Syrian Civil War for several reasons: (1) to preserve both the principle of state and UN sovereignty over Western interventionism and Russia’s role in the Middle East and globally by ensuring Russia’s say in the outcome of the Syrian war and crisis; (2) to weaken the global jihadi revolutionary movement, which includes the Islamic State (IS), Al Qaeda (AQ) and host of other jihadi groups, in order to reduce the likelihood of jihadi terrorism at home by the IS affiliate ‘Vilaiyat Kavkaz Islamskogo Gosudarstvo’ (the Caucasus Province of the Islamic State) or the AQ-allied Imarat Kavkaz (Caucasus Emirate); and (3) to create a balance of power between the pro-Western and pro-Islamist Sunni regimes, and the Shi’a in the Middle East. Other factors that have contributed to Russia’s intervention in the Syrian War stem from two of Russia’s principle beliefs in regard to Foreign Policy. The first would be Moscow’s prediction of the collapse of the Assad regime as imminent and the belief it could prevent this outcome with a large-scale intervention. The second being Moscow’s concerns; Russian officials believed that such an outcome would have had significant negative repercussions for the country’s national security, both in terms of the terrorist threat and the legitimization of Western-backed regime change. This paper focuses on the diplomatic and military decisions made in the past by various actors involved-and how they affect the success of Russian President Vladmir Putin’s efforts in Syria to protect the interests of Russia and improve its own domestic security.
Six years ago, President Vladmir Putin offered a solution with the intention of preserving the United Nations sovereignty over Western interventionism at the 70th anniversary session of the United Nations general assembly in New York City back in 2015. At this conference President Vladmir Putin proposed that an international coalition be established in order to combat the global Jihadist movement, primarily in the Middle East. Another option Putin had in the past, was the use of counter-terrorism as a means of elevating its global influence aside from strengthening economic ties with the West. After 9/11 President Putin aimed to improve the relations between the United States and Russia by joining the US in the war against terror in Afghanistan. This move by Putin was monumental in terms of rekindling the ties between the United States and Russia considering the fact that during the Soviet-Afghan War the United States was giving military assistance to the mujahideen at the time in order to defeat the Soviet army. Shortly after the war ended, the mujahideen became the Taliban, the primary target of the United States in its war efforts during the War On Terror in Afghanistan. Putin was only in his first term of office when he made this decision. Putin believed that the road to restoring Russia as a prosperous great power lay through enhanced economic cooperation with the U.S. and Europe. The terrorist attacks provided an opportunity to partner with America and elevate Russia’s international standing.
Another example of Moscow upholding the principle of the United Nations in Syria was their support of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan who was in charge of creating the UN-Arab League peace plan that would hopefully restore peace to the country. Moscow supported the six point peace plan drafted by the joint envoy with the goal of preventing further violence, and the ongoing conflict that was ignited by the uprising against Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad. The six-points entailed in the peace plan were: (1) commit to work with the Envoy in an inclusive Syrian-led political process to address the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people, and, to this end, commit to appoint an empowered interlocutor when invited to do so by the Envoy; (2) commit to stop the fighting and achieve urgently an effective United Nations supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties to protect civilians and stabilize the country. (3) ensure timely provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the fighting, and to this end, as immediate steps, to accept and implement a daily two hour humanitarian pause and to coordinate exact time and modalities of the daily pause through an efficient mechanism, including at local level; (4) intensify the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons, including especially vulnerable categories of persons, and persons involved in peaceful political activities, provide without delay through appropriate channels a list of all places in which such persons are being detained, immediately begin organizing access to such locations and through appropriate channels respond promptly to all written requests for information, access or release regarding such persons; (5) ensure freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists and a non-discriminatory visa policy for them; (6) respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as legally guaranteed. The plan was drafted with the intent of stablizing the ongoing crisis, and it seemed like there was a chance that his would happen when the Syrian government agreed to the terms. However, the various factions on the opposition side either believed the government would not keep its word, or did not believe the proposal covered all of the issues they had with the regime. With the United Nations efforts to restore peace foiled, Russia was left with no other option, but to intervene on their own. For Russia the chances that Syria could fall victim to a Western backed regime change and become a breeding ground for jihadists that could eventually launch terror attacks within their borders became too high, leaving them no other option but to intervene. The lessons learned from past conflicts prepared Russia for military intervention if necessary.
Russia’s assistance in Afghanistan during the early stages of the War on Terror came with the benefits from its own experience at war against an experienced guerilla force that knew how utilize the country’s terrain which was a logistical nightmare for conventional fighting forces to their advantage. Lessons learned from fighting in Afghanistan put Moscow in a unique position to offer advice and assistance given its detailed knowledge of Afghanistan and experience working with the Northern Alliance. Past experience from Soviet operations helped Russia obtain and provide the intelligence that led to the success of Operation Enduring Freedom by US forces. However, the cooperation and assistance the United States gained from Russia post-9/11 was short lived. Cooperation between the two nations began to falter when the United States decided that it would place military bases in Central Asia. Putin unsuccessfully tried to dissuade Central Asian leaders from accepting the bases, then changed course after realizing that he could not prevent their establishment, and the U.S. opened two bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Semantics also proved to be another issue at play since the definition of who a terrorist was differentiated between both governments. To Russia a terrorist was defined as someone who “intentionally conducts acts of terror in Russian territory, or against Russian interests abroad which differentiated from the United States’ definition which was, “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives”. Eventually, in 2001 there were Chechens fighting with al-Qaida in Afghanistan and there were al-Qaida operatives in the North Caucasus, which brought the threat of terrorism home to Russia. The events that unfolded during 2001 in the North Caucasus led to Moscow’s policy of getting involved in conflicts if it allows or creates a terrorist threat domestically.
During the United Nations 70th anniversary assembly Putin reiterated his intentions of creating an international coalition focused on combating Jihadist movements. Putin broached “a broad, international, anti-terrorist coalition,” which, in Putin’s view “like the anti-Hitler coalition, could unite in its ranks very different forces prepared to decisively resist those who like the Nazis sew evil and hatred of mankind.” “(T)he key participants of such a coalition should be Muslim countries,”. Thus, the new proposal would add a series of other Muslim countries to the forces of the coalition as first proposed. Thus, in addition to those forces in Iraq and Syria already fighting the Islamic State and other jihadi organizations, groups in Jordan, Egypt, and other Muslim countries that have expressed an interest in fighting the jihadists. Considering the threats Russia was dealing with domestically from jihadist groups afilliated with Al-Qaeda and its offshoot The Islamic State, Syria provided Moscow the opportunity to weaken the international jihadist network right where these two groups were primarily operating at the time. Along with the uptick in terrorist activity at home back in 2001, and Russia’s past dealing with the mujahideen, Russia was worried about the threat of domestic terrorism increasing after the Arab Spring led to revolutions in Libya and Syria, which created new recruiting and grounds for international groups. Russia is home to the largest indigenous Muslim population in Europe, around 16 million (approximately 11–12 percent of the country’s population), and borders Muslim-majority states. Russia feared that the possible establishment of an Islamic Caliphate would inspire jihadist movements within or along its borders. With that being said, the Kremlin viewed the Syrian conflict as a battle between disparate religious extremist forces and a secular state, a reprise of conflicts such as Russia’s own struggle with Chechen separatism and the Soviet Union’s war against the mujahideen in Afghanistan. It must be mentioned that The Islamic State is not the only jihadist group operating in Syria, and there were numerous jihadist groups alligned together in the conflict against the Assad regime.
When the conflict in Syria erupted back in 2011, footage was being released of Syrian forces dropping barrel bombs on neighborhoods in the city of Aleppo. According to Amnesty International more than 11,000 civilians have been killed since 2012 by these attacks. When the videos posted by the white helmets, also known as The Syria Civil Defense, responding to barrel bomb attacks began to gain the attention of Westerners the United States issued economic sanctions against Syria. In 2013, the CIA began a secret program to arm and train Syrian rebels. The failed operation that sent over $1 billion to opposition forces in the country was called “Timber Sycamore”. However, Assad had already begun to receive support from nations, which led to the failure of Operation Timber Sycamore. Prior to Operation Sycamore, a report from the United States Defense Intelligence Agency containing substantial information pertaining to intelligence gathered at the time in regard to what was unfolding in Syria was released in 2012. At no surprise Assad’s regime began to receive support from Russia, as well as China and Iran early on in the conflict. Moscow supported the Assad regime diplomatically, militarily, and financially, but without overt and direct intervention using its own forces. The document also states that Al-Qaedea supported the Syrian opposition from the beginning, both ideologically and through the media. Al Qaeda declared its opposition to Assad’s government because it considered it a sectarian regime targeting sunnis. This information is helpful in terms of disseminating the United States’ narrative that Russia has been conducting airstrikes against the rebel forces.
By 2015 the United States had cut it’s support for the Free Syrian Army. According to the Department of State, there is no military solution to the Syrian conflict. On their website it states, “As we have seen, the Syrian regime, Russian, and Iranian military actions only offer more destruction and death” The alliance situation in Syria at the beginning of the war was complex when it came to non-state actors. For example, The Free Syrian Army (FSA), a collection of various rebel groups that were receiving weapons from the United States who viewed them as a moderate force, also found themselves coordinating with radical groups such as Jahbat Al-Nusra and the Islamic Front. These same rebel groups who were fighting ISIS, also found themselves at times fighting against regime forces together. Despite the fact the FSA was not officially aligned with these jihadist groups, the bottom line for Putin and Assad is that the FSA is allied against Assad and often sides with (but also at times fights against) the jihadists of JN and the Islamic Front, if not IS. Before the United States ended its support towards the FSA in 2014, Assad’s hold on crucial provinces began to diminish at the hands of the rebels; in February, 2014 JN seized the town of Morek on the strategic M5 highway extending the jihadi rebels’ hold on Idlib province south to Hama province and towards Hama city, thereby preventing Syrian army’s efforts to move north and challenge rebel strongholds in Aleppo and Idlib. It was the successful offensives in Hama and Homs that threatened the security of Russian military interests leading them to begin striking non-state actors in the country. At this point Russia involvement was inevitable considering the United States had already intervened in the conflict two years prior and its own interests were at stake. Prior to 2014, Russia was already supplying Assad’s forces with military aid to help support their efforts against the opposition. According to press reports, initial deliveries were mostly ammunition, small arms, and light weapons, but eventually Moscow began supplying attack helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, air-defense systems, armored vehicles, radars,electronic warfare systems, and guided bombs. A few years later, Russia began to support the regime forces directly with airstrikes on rebel forces in order to prevent their military bases on Syria’s Western coast which were relatively close to rebel strongholds of Hama and Homs from coming under attack. The additional air support provided by Russia against rebel forces allowed Syrian forces to eventually take back important cities like Hama and Homs. At this point in the war Russian air support had become a major factor in turning the tide of the war in favor of Assad’s regime.
It is important to take a look at the decisions made by Russia and Iran to assist Assad’s regime from losing complete control of the country because of the impact their support had on the outcome of the war. Before directly intervening in the conflict, Russian and Iranian officials met to coordinate a strategy that would strengthen regime forces. In January 2015, Ali Akbar Velayati, foreign policy adviser to Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei, met with President Putin and Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu in Moscow to deliver a letter from Khamenei. The meeting was preceded by a bilateral agreement on military-technical cooperation and high-level meetings in Tehran between Iranian military officials and Sergei Shoigu, the first time in 15 years that a Russian defense minister paid an official visit to Iran. The restored cooperation between Russia and Iran came at a time when rebel forces and the Islamic State were rapidly gaining territory and Demascus was at risk of being lost to the opposition. From July 24 to July 26, Soleimani covertly met with Putin and Shoigu in Moscow to coordinate the military operation in Syria. Due to the lack of success from the Syrian regime’s commanding officers, the responsibility of coordination for operations was left up to officers from various branches of the Russian military. To facilitate Russian coordination with these groups, liaison elements from Syrian intelligence, IRGC combat detachments, Hezbollah, Al-Quds, and National Defense Forces were placed at the Russian command post in Khmeimim. Around this time, a series of media reports indicated a growing presence of Russian military hardware and personnel on the ground in Syria, which the Russian Foreign Ministry described as “supplying military equipment to official Syrian authorities to fight terrorists.” Implementation of this equipment was utilized by the Syrian regime’s forces to regain control of the territory lost early on in the war, at a time when the possibility of losing the war was looming over the horizon. By giving military support to Assad, it gave his military the necessary equipment to eventually stabilize the country, eliminate the Islamic State and the other jihadist organizations operating in the country. By late September of 2015, Moscow announced the establishment of the Baghdad Information Center—a joint intelligence-sharing center in Baghdad between Russia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria with the primary function to coordinate intelligence against the IS and operations around the Syrian-Iraqi border. Joint coordination between these four nations helped minimize the potential consequences that would arise from a collapse of the Syrian state. Even though the operations coordinated by Russia and Iran had much success, Moscow still feared the possibility that actors aside from the Syrian government would gain too much influence. In order to prevent these potential consequences from coming into existence, Russia began to bolster the forces of the Syrian army. It sought to train a unified and professionalized force akin to Syria’s 25th Special Mission Division while providing the Syrian Army with weaponry—including T-90 tanks, modern armored personnel carriers, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Russia has relied on General Suheil al-Hassan’s 25th Special Mission Division (formerly known as the Tiger Forces) and Zayd Salih’s 5th Volunteer Assault Corps to reinforce its leverage in Syria.
In Moscow, the Kremlin concluded that regime collapse in Syria would entail grave and irreversible consequences for Russia. These consequences were the risk of international terrorism and a newly western backed government in the Middle East. In 2017, as Russia became involved and the Free Syrian Army collapsed, the United States shifted its support to various Kurdish forces who were clearing the Islamic State from predominantly Kurdish regions in the northeastern part of the country. Supporting the Kurdish forces gave the United States a proxy capable of defeating ISIS and willing to establish a democratic government even if the system was democratic confederalism. However, this alliance was short-lived. The decision to abandon the Kurds in Syria by President Donald Trump in 2019 left the former regional allies with no other choice, but to come to terms with the Syrian regime to protect them from Turkish aggression. With new bases in Syria, Putin can restrain Erdogan in his drive to drive the Kurds from his border and protect them under any scheme to ensure their security or, less likely, carve out a Kurdish state in Iraq. A failed intervention by the United States for what now can be considered the losing side, has only strengthened ties between Russia, Syria, and Iran. Due to the poor decisions made by the Obama and Trump administrations, Russia’s role in Syria has given them geopolitical leverage in the Middle East due to the success Assad has had taking back Syria. The common perception today is that Russia has won in Syria, having supported the government of Bashar al-Assad, which is now steadily reasserting its control over previously lost territory.
The war in Syria has been complex for the state actors involved in conflict. Forces that were once supported by the United States at the beginning of the conflict are now being trained and armed by Turkey as the Syrian National Army. On November 1st of 2021, it was announced that negotiations between Turkey and Russia were being held to clear the Kurdish factions holding territory along Syria’s M4 highway. The M4 highway is a significant route of transportation since it cuts across Syria and through most of the important cities located in the northern half of the country. Russia, the United States, and Turkey each have a share of control in this critical highway and are struggling to de-escalate military tensions as they continue to compete in the country. Russia’s decision to work with Turkey turned the tide of the situation in Syria for Assad, “The groups that were educated and equipped by the United States west of the Euphrates,” wrote Turkish journalist Fehim Tastekin for Al-Monitor, “are now fighting against the groups east of the Euphrates that have been also educated and equipped by the United States.” Russia being able to take control of the situation in Syria by swaying Turkey, a NATO ally away from supporting the United States and the West in its anti-Assad efforts was pivotal. There were very few options for ground forces deployed in Syria by the United States, but to withdraw East and protect the oil fields located there.
Like other state actors involved in the conflict, Turkey has been capitalizing on the war to combat the left-wing militant organizations such as the Syrian Defence Forces (SDF) and the People Defence Forces (YPG). The autonomous region of Rojava which was carved out by Kurdish forces has faced three invasions launched by the Turkish military and the rebel groups it supports. In 2019, Turkish President Erdogan launched a cross border assault called “Operation Peace Spring” by the Turkish military and allied Syrian rebel factions. He said they aimed “to prevent the creation of a terror corridor across our southern border, and to bring peace to the area”. A prime example of successful cooperation between Russia and Turkey was Russia’s use of Turkey to give Assad’s forces a tactical advantage was the implementation of various outposts in the northwestern part of the country. Southwest of the Turkish border, Turkey built a chain of outposts around Idlib, the last largely rebel-held area southwest of Afrin, as a buffer with Russian and Syrian regime forces to the east. The construction of these outposts and their purpose of serving as a buffer for Russian and Syrian forces has allowed Turkish and Russian forces conduct joint patrols in the area, and Russia, meanwhile, has pledged to disarm Kurdish fighters in a 30km (18.5 miles) strip across the entire Syrian border. The most crucial city along the border Kobane, a highly symbolic prize for Kurdish forces on the Turkish border, wedged between Turkish-controlled Jarablus and Tal Abyad. However, even though there has been cooperation between the two states Turkey has not been satisfied with the various attacks launched on their forces by the YPG and SDF, but Ankara says Russia has not kept their side of the bargain, and that Kurdish forces, especially the YPG, continue to attack civilians and Turkish security forces in the area. Over the last few weeks, President Erdogan has repeatedly said Turkey would “do whatever it takes”, to remove all Kurdish threats along the border and feels as though Russia has not been doing their part in making sure these attacks do not occur. Erdogan’s recent disagreements with Russia concerning the shelling from Kurdish forces against Turkish forces in the areas under their control just south of the Syrian border caused some strife initially. However, if things continue to work out between Syrian regime forces, the Turkish military, and the Turkish backed rebels known as the Syrian National Army. Assad’s forces can slowly regain ground lost from the SDF with Turkish support.
Russia continues to maintain leverage over the outcome of the war from improving its relationship relations with Turkey in Syria. Turkey is now closer to Moscow than Washington and bought Russian S-400 air defense systems from Moscow to demonstrate it. Because of the support Russia has given Syria with Turkey’s assistance, the common perception today is that Russia has won in Syria, having supported the government of Bashar al-Assad, which is now steadily reasserting its control over previously lost territory. As a result, Russia has inserted itself as the power broker in Syria, if not the entire Middle East. Becoming the power broker in Syria is not the only thing Russia has gained from successfully intervening in Syria. They have also established what can be a permanent military presence in Syria far beyond the small naval base it possessed before. Just recently, it took over the abandoned US base in Kobani and a helicopter base at Qamishli, both near the Turkish border. Looking back at the United States track record in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria. It is safe to say that they have not been successful in any of them. The era in which the United States and/or the West (NATO) can dictate outcomes anywhere across the globe unilaterally has ended. Events in Syria are but the latest confirmation of this fact. Moscow is now in the position to continue pursuing its national interests without much retaliation from the West. Implementation of economic sanctions against Syria to inhibit their ability to regain the country seem to have minimal effects on their economy, since Russia and Syria have found ways to avoid these sanctions through their cooperation with Iran. For example, Russia and Iran have delivered oil to the Syrian government by using Promsyrioimport, a subsidiary of the Russian Ministry of Energy initially used to evade sanctions under Moscow’s “oil for goods” scheme with Iran prior to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Implementation of sanctions against the Syrian regime, has only led to coordination between these three nations to avoid sanctions not only now, but in the future as well. Russia’s relationship with Iran demonstrates Moscow’s ability to compartmentalize its foreign policy by concentrating on areas of cooperation to mitigate tensions elsewhere in the relationship. Russia’s willingness to reestablish ties that were made in the past with other nations by focusing on areas in their foreign policy that align, has proven to give them an advantage in the multipolar geopolitical landscape that exists today. Without straying away from its foreign policy, Moscow has capitalized on the failures of the West in past interventions and used it to their advantage. Rather than attempting to forcefully ensure national interests, Russia has focused on utilizing the bureaucratic means available to them, and resorting to military force when necessary.Russia’s successful intervention has boosted their influence and leverage in the Middle East. Failure to successfully intervene militarily by the West has opened up the door to their foes in the region to create new and strong ties with different countries in the region, making it that much harder to achieve their geopolitical goals. Unless the United States and its NATO allies can find alternative methods to ensuring their position of being the global hegemonic powers, they continue to keep strengthening the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, and creating a phalanx of authoritarian regimes strongly opposed to American and even Western interests. Moscow has also successfully targeted the jihadist organizations in Syria without toppling the totalitarian regime in place that prevent these groups from committing terrorist attacks on a larger scale, and establishing a caliphate that could potentially launching attacks against Russia. Creating a power balance between the pro-Sunni and pro-Shi’a regimes is a process that is still at work, but cooperation with the various Muslim state and non-state actors is just the beginning to establishing that balance in the Middle East. Russia’s intervention in the conflict has been a success by making sure their national interests were met, and it also has created new partnerships in the Middle East that will be advantageous in the future.
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